Review of Ireland’s Foreign Policy and External Relations

Submission

as part of the process of public consultation by

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The views expressed in this submission are solely those of the author writing in a private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of an employer, national government or sponsor.
Introduction

The Tánaiste has launched a process of public consultation as part of a review of Ireland’s Foreign Policy and External Relations. The purpose of the Government’s consultation paper is to seek the views of interested stakeholders and members of the public. It provides some context for the review and sets out a number of issues for consideration. Individuals making a submission can address any issue related to Ireland’s foreign policy which they consider to be of relevance, including any not explicitly raised in the consultation document. (Ireland, 2014: 3)

This submission is written in a private academic capacity following over fifteen years of research on Irish foreign policy, Irish and European public attitudes to Irish neutrality and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Irish political party positions on the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Irish neutrality, and the foreign policy values and identities of Irish leaders throughout several centuries, much of which has been published in top globally-ranked peer-reviewed academic Political Science and International Relations journals, such as Cooperation and Conflict, International Political Science Review, Irish Political Studies and Swiss Political Science Review.

The submission proceeds to address five main issues: (1) Ireland’s foreign policy values; (2) the recent reversal of three centuries of Irish Foreign Policy (IFP) norms by successive governments; (3) the European Union (EU)’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); (4) salient global problems; and (5) the politics of discourses on Irish Foreign Policy and EU CSDP. In doing so, the submission addresses (a) what IFP priorities should be, (b) how Ireland’s foreign policy should be conducted, and (c) how Ireland’s influence can be enhanced in a way that contributes to the common good of humanity, not just Ireland or Europe, and especially the good of those who are suffering. By focusing on enhancing the good of humanity as the primary objective of IFP, the Irish state and her peoples at home and abroad can expect to benefit from increased trust, goodwill, and an overall improved global environment for the realisation of human security.

(1) Ireland’s values and interests

The remit of the review provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade contains a series of questions for consideration. Arguably, the order of a list can denote a hierarchy and order of priorities. In the 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy, following a note that a section on Anglo-Irish Relations and Northern Ireland had been purposely omitted given the political situation at the time, presented the following IFP agenda (1) Ireland and Europe; (2) International Security; (3) The United Nations; (4) Disarmament and Arms Control; (5) Peacekeeping; (6) Human Rights; (7) Development Co-operation; (8) Trade and International Economic Cooperation; (9) Irish Abroad; and (10) Public Interest in Foreign Policy. The latter included a hope for greater academic interest in the study of Irish foreign policy. This submission responds to that hope.

The Department of Foreign Affairs Strategy Statement 2005-2007 listed six high-level goals (Ireland, 2005: 9): (1) Anglo-Irish Relations: “to achieve the Good Friday Agreement”; (2) to
pursue IFP in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of the UN Charter, through CFSP participation, bilateral relationships with other states, and international organisations; (3) Ireland’s interests in the EU and relations with current and future EU members; (4) Trade, investments and other interests, including culture; (5) the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and programmes of Development Cooperation Ireland, and (6) the interests of Irish citizens abroad and relations with Ireland’s emigrant descendants (diaspora). Trade had migrated from eighth position on the 1996 agenda to fourth in the 2007 list of goals.

The list of goals in the 2011-2014 strategy statement is: (1) Promote Ireland’s economic interests in Europe and internationally (2) Deliver on Ireland’s global development commitments, focusing on poverty and hunger (3) Advance reconciliation and co-operation on this island (4) Contribute to international peace, security and human rights (5) Provide consular and passport services for Irish citizens and engage with Irish communities abroad. The introduction by the Minister states: “The period 2011 to 2014 will be one where the focus of government activity will be on economic renewal through the promotion of sustainable growth and investment. The Department will have the leading role, in close cooperation with the State Agencies, Irish business and the Global Irish Network, in fostering the international dimension of Ireland’s economic growth.” (emphasis added) This change in priorities away from foreign policy and towards trade is signalled through the change in name of the “Department of Foreign Affairs” to the “Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade” wrought by the Fine Gael-Labour coalition government upon assuming office in 2011. It raises a question regarding the balance between the level of resources devoted to innovative foreign policy reflecting Irish values, and those devoted to enabling trade and investments. In understanding how foreign policy interests are formulated, Garret FitzGerald (2000) admitted that national governments take decisions that operate against the interests of society as a whole, due to pressure from vested interests. In a television interview, in the context of Ireland’s facilitation of the US-led war against Iraq in 2003, Garret FitzGerald defined foreign policy as the “interests of the State”, arguing that foreign policy is not “about values or ideals.” I disagree, as do many Irish people. Irish Foreign Policy is about values and ideals, particularly in matters concerning war and peace, when human lives, dignity and welfare are at stake. Section 5 of this submission, on global issues, sets out clearly, using speeches of Éamon de Valera (1932) and the current President of Ireland, Michael D. Higgins (2013), a core value of Irish Foreign Policy: resisting pressure from vested interests in the pursuit of a just global order for the benefit of Ireland and the wider world.

Whilst the “Issues for Consultation” section of the Irish Foreign Policy Review Document poses its first question, “How should Ireland’s values and interests be promoted through its foreign policy?” (Ireland, 2014: 4, emphasis added), the document fails to outline what Ireland’s values are. This oversight is linked to the eradication of neutrality as a central organising framework for Irish Foreign Policy. Within academia, constructivism is an international relations theory developed in the early 1990s in response to a perception that the dominant theories of realism and liberalism lack analytical purchase and relevance to the ‘real world’ of global politics. Constructivists, particularly ‘critical’ constructivists, challenge realist and liberal assumptions that interests derive from material sources and argue that “who we are” can predict “what we want”: for constructivists, identities underpin interests (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 86-87). And we know ‘who we are’, in part, by ‘what we stand for’ because “all identities involve values and
commitments, and the acquisition of identity means coming to accept these values and commitments.” (Poole, 1999: 46 quoted in Devine, 2008a: 473) The logical corollary suggests that values determine identity, from which interests are derived. Values are essentially higher order cognitions (beliefs) that determine identities and interests, and in turn, behaviour, i.e. state foreign policy.

These constructivist premises are evident in Ireland’s 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy. The White Paper on Foreign Policy started with the title “Values in Ireland’s Foreign Policy” and an opening sentence: “Ireland’s foreign policy is about much more than self-interest. For many of us it is a statement of the kind of people we are”. (Ireland, 1996: 7) The White Paper acknowledged that “the majority of the Irish people have always cherished Ireland’s military neutrality, and recognise the positive values that inspire it, in peace-time as well as time of war” (Government of Ireland, 1996: 15). The White Paper states that “the values that underlie Ireland’s policy of neutrality have therefore informed almost every aspect of our foreign policy” (Ireland, 1996: 119) and cites an example by referring to ‘impartiality’, an important element of the public concept of neutrality: “our international reputation for impartiality has enabled us to play a meaningful role in the preservation of peace in the world” (Ireland, 1996: 119). The next sub-section of this submission sets out the values in Ireland’s foreign policy: values that, for centuries, have cohered around neutrality, which functions as a normative glue and framework concept for all of Ireland’s external relations and foreign policy positions and behaviours.

The 2014 Review Document repeats the 1996 White Paper premise that “The interests we pursue and the values we promote abroad are a statement of who we are as a people.” (Ireland, 2014: 3) From this perspective, it is notable that the last Review Document’s ‘Issue for Consultation’ listed is: “Promoting a Positive Image of Ireland”, an issue associated with the question: “How can our foreign policy contribute to a clear and identifiable image of Ireland abroad?” (Ireland, 2014: 11) Prior to and after gaining independence, Ireland always had a clear and identifiable image abroad through the principles and foreign policy exercise of positive, active neutrality. However, this positive image has been effectively erased through the foreign policy decisions of political elites over the past four decades, the details of which are outlined in Section 2 of this submission. I argue that the order of the Review Document’s priorities should be reversed, because promoting a positive image abroad through concrete foreign policy positions and actions underpins all of the issues referred to: I will return to this point in the Conclusions section of this submission.

Irish foreign policy values articulated by political leaders across four centuries

In an article published in 2013 as part of a special issue of Swiss Political Science Review on Natural Born Peacemakers? Ideas and identities in foreign policies of small states in Western Europe, research shows the remarkable continuity in Irish leaders’ foreign policy values across several centuries. In the 1700s and 1800s, Theobald Wolfe Tone advocated Irish independence in foreign affairs and Irish neutrality in wars (Tone in Moody et al. 2009: 54, 52) and Daniel O’Connell promoted the values of anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, anti-racism, independence, and equality in interdependence, respectively. Taken together, the core foreign policy values of Irish leaders
during this era were: independence and neutrality for Ireland in the cause of peace and security; self-determination; anti-imperialism; third world solidarity; and resistance to famine and slavery. Mindful of the looming centenary of the 1916 Rising, it is worth noting that two significant leaders of the Rising, James Connolly and Pádraic Pearse, wanted to achieve independence for Ireland as peacefully as possible, and were specific about the limits to the exercise of violence in what they knew was to be a doomed uprising (Connolly 1916b; Pearse 1924: 322-323). Their execution at the hands of British authorities after the rebellion was crushed, sedimented rather than expunged centuries-long norms and values of Ireland’s peace policy and foreign policy: the right to self-determination and independence; the notion of equality of nations regardless of size; resistance to the usurpation of natural rights of peoples or states; and a fearless determination to uphold fundamental rights and freedoms, set in the context of a deep, conscious knowledge of the horror of war and consequences of imperialism and colonisation.

In the early 1900s, after Ireland gained statehood, institutional cooperation; a constitutional commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes; armed neutrality; UN peacekeeping; and an explicit subordination of material interests for moral, justice-based norms, were added to the list of foreign policy values, objectives and practices. Through his leadership in the early years of the Irish state, Éamon de Valera cemented the norms, discourses and practices of Ireland’s policy: he promoted Ireland’s independence; wrote the Irish Constitution of 1937; secured Irish neutrality during World War II and with that, the Irish state and her people. (Devine, 2013: 385) In what was considered the best speech ever made by a President of the Council at the League of Nations on 26 September 1932 (Gageby 1999: 37), Éamon de Valera outlined the fundamentals of Ireland’s foreign policy:

… we in Ireland desire peace, peace at home and throughout the world. In spite of the opinions you may have formed from misleading reports, I want you to know that our history is the history of a people who have consistently sought only to be allowed to lead their own lives in their own way, in peace with their neighbours and with the world. If we are left free, our way will be the way of peace, of thinking in terms, not of selfish interest, not of the acquisition of territory, nor of petty power, but of human beings living as they have a right to live, in the best that their own energies and our State can give them, whilst contributing to the world the best that is in us.

These signifiers – independence, self-determination, global cosmopolitanism, anti-colonization, anti-imperialism – are omitted in later Irish leaders’ discourses on Irish foreign policy due to their desire for Ireland to become a member of the EEC, and in response to pressures to join NATO and engage in power projection through a European foreign policy identity from the Six EEC members throughout the 1960s (Devine 2011: 339-340). This is despite the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs most openly hostile to neutrality in Ireland’s history, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, acknowledged the value of neutrality in facilitating the conduct of “the “positive merits” of Irish foreign policy in the 1980s: UN peacekeeping, the nuclear non proliferation treaty, decolonization initiatives, opposing South African apartheid, accepting refugees, opposing US funding of South American paramilitaries, increasing aid to the Third World, and supporting Palestinian self-determination.” (Dáil Éireann Vol. 327: Col. 1425–1426 cited in Devine 2009a: 478)
Irish foreign policy values adhered to by the mass public across three decades

The Irish public also define neutrality in the same normative framework: the most strongly supported public concepts closely resemble the wider, “active” concept of neutrality that embodies characteristics such as peace promotion, nonaggression, the primacy of the UN, and the confinement of state military activity to UN peacekeeping, not being involved in wars, and maintaining Ireland’s independence, identity, and independent foreign policy decision-making particularly in the context of “big power” pressure. (Devine, 2008a: 471) The claim the government makes regarding the public’s definitions of neutrality – e.g. the then Minister for State Mr. Tom Kitt, TD declared in Dáil Éireann that “the central and defining characteristic of Irish people in this area ... is our non-participation in military alliances” (*Irish Times*, 2003) – is simply wrong. Empirical evidence shows that the public’s concept of neutrality is the broader, active concept of Irish neutrality that accords with traditional norms and the international law on neutrality (see Table 1).

Irish public opinion on foreign policy is extremely politicised because Treaties that extend the scope of the objectives of the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) are subject to a ratification device of a binding referendum in Ireland. Opinion polls have shown that Irish neutrality is the top substantive policy reason given by Irish people who voted against the Single European Act (Jones 1987), and the Maastricht (Marsh 1992), Amsterdam (Sinnott 1998) and Nice Treaties (Sinnott 2001; Jupp 2002) in referendums. As the gap between the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes has narrowed in parallel with the expansion of EU foreign, security and defence policy, referendum campaigns in Ireland have become increasingly contentious and fraught because a ratification failure in one or more EU member-states means the Treaty in question cannot come into force. In June 2008, the Irish people rejected the Lisbon Treaty by a substantial margin of 53.4 percent against, 46.6 percent in favour, based on a healthy turnout of 53.1 percent, and another phase of European integration was brought to a grinding halt. Neutrality was the most divisive issue in the Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign. Research showed that “strengthening neutrality” was a major driver of people’s decision to vote ‘no’. Public concepts of neutrality and foreign policy identities are slow to change, in part because their associated values are a function of cultural and historical experience. The top three definitional elements of neutrality have remained consistent over time: “not getting involved in war,” “independence/staying independent,” “not taking sides [in wars]/impartiality” (Devine, 2008a: 473).

Public attitudes have also remained stable: support for neutrality is fairly consistent over successive decades - roughly 2 in 3 people wish to retain it (See Table 1). Different question wording, variation in the number and nature of response options, and in the scales used, e.g. a likert (five-point) vs. an eleven-point scale, would account for some variance in responses, therefore, responses are analysed within groups of similar questions. The radical divergence between government ‘military neutrality’ (narrowly defined as non-membership of a military alliance) and public active ‘neutrality’ concepts has been noted for several decades (Keatinge 1984: 118; McSweeney 1985; Fanning 1996: 147) but the terms ‘military neutrality’ and ‘neutrality’ are used interchangeably in public opinion analysis. This vital premise for understanding public opinion is ignored (1) “for ease of expression” (Gilland 2001: 159); (2) due to political bias: as “One’s interest in a particular policy can be a powerful motive for defining
the concept underlying it in terms restricted to that policy” (McSweeney 1999: 82) and research money flows to those “visible and effective scholars” and think-tanks ’experts’ who agree with the government view (Page and Shapiro 1992: 381)); and (3) due to adherence to realism. (Page and Shapiro 1992: 387) Interpretation is also a consistent problem as question wording proposing an option of being “prepared to consider” joining an alliance is routinely interpreted and published in national media as “wanting to join” or being “prepared to join” a military alliance rather than the real meaning - being prepared to consider such a proposal.

**TABLE 1: ATTITUDE TO NEUTRALITY AND ‘MILITARY NEUTRALITY’ (%), 1981-2003**

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<td>Neutrality-remain</td>
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<td>Gulf I - neutral</td>
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<td>Gulf II - military intervention unjustified</td>
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<td>EC Defence-join</td>
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Sources:
1988/1989: Survey shows that 84% want neutral stance maintained. The Irish Times Jan 10, 1992 (newspaper article) refers to the study
1991 Jan: IOPA, Survey for Irish Times by MRBI (code: MRBI/3930/91), between 1991-01-03 and 1991-01-03. Also: 69% say Republic should remain neutral over Gulf. The Irish Times Jan 26, 1991 (newspaper article) refers to the study whose fieldwork was on January 23rd.
2003: International Crisis Survey 21st- 27th of January 2003 conducted by EOS Gallup Europe network 16489 people aged 15 years in 15 Member States of the European Union, the 13 Candidate Countries, Norway and Switzerland: http://www.paks.uni-duesseldorf.de/

Looking at the four polling agency surveys (Table 1) conducted for newspapers (“MRBI”) that asked similar questions about neutrality: 65% were against dropping it in 1991, 59% wanted it to remain in 1992; whilst 69% in 1996 and 72% in 2001 wanted to maintain it. None of the differences showed a dramatic shift from one poll to the next i.e. more than 10 percentage points (Shapiro and Page 1988: 216-217), indicating rationality in the absence of changed circumstances. A political party poll taken in 1981 using half the regular sample size found that 76% felt it was important to maintain it. Two academic surveys using different scales to the newspaper surveys found that in 1988-1989, 84% and in 2001-2002, 80% of respondents respectively wanted to
retain (or did not reject) neutrality, which is consistent. One newspaper survey in 1992 that found 55% favoured retaining neutrality, although its outlier status is explicable given respondents were offered multiple and ill-defined (e.g. “join in wider European Security Zone”) response options, in contrast to the straightforward binary options in other surveys. Three surveys asking Irish people about involvement in the first and second Gulf Wars, found that in 1991, 69% and in 1992, 71% were against involvement in the first war, and in 2003, 81% were against involvement in the second, meeting the ‘rational’ consistency standard. Looking at responses of those prepared to consider joining an alliance (25%) in 1985, those wishing to change neutrality (20%) in 1996, and those wishing to reject neutrality (20%) in 2001-2002, the size of this cohort is broadly consistent over time. The specific option of joining a European Common Defence appealed to 25%, 28% and 19% of people in three early 1990s newspaper polls. Similarly worded questions on proximate foreign policy concepts show that, over time, public opinion does not change capriciously.

When the Irish government acknowledged that “for many of us [Ireland’s foreign policy] is a statement of the kind of people we are” in the 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy (Ireland, 1996: 55), it also acknowledged that “the majority of the Irish people have always cherished Ireland’s military neutrality, and recognise the positive values that inspire it, in peace-time as well as time of war” (Ireland, 1996: 15). Normative democratic theory supports the view that citizens are a wise source of foreign policy, preventing foreign policy designed solely in the interests of elites. Gaps between the policy preferences of leaders and citizens are seen as problematic and reflecting different values and interests, rather than levels of attention or information. (Devine, 2008a: 463) If democracy is a core value that is supposed to inform the formulation and execution of Irish Foreign Policy, the government must reverse the wholesale changes to Ireland’s Foreign Policy (detailed in Section 3), reclaim the neutrality-oriented traditions of Irish Foreign Policy and translate the Irish peoples’ values into ethical, innovative and effective foreign policy initiatives. The Government have failed to do so since the 1960s because “EC states were hostile to the continuation of Irish neutrality” (Keatinge, 1985: 175; see Maher (1986) and Keogh (1997)). Irish Government elites felt it prudent to deny the existence of these EEC demands to eradicate neutrality, in order to achieve EEC membership in the face of public desire to retain neutrality.

The European Commission was equally hostile to the continuation of Austrian, Finnish and Swedish neutrality during their accession negotiations, as it was to Ireland in the 1960s (European Commission 1991, 1992a: 18; 1992b, 1992c) and suggested neutrality be effectively defined out of existence because of its incompatibility with future EU defence policy: the concept was narrowed to just one characteristic, non-membership of a military alliance (i.e. the broader ‘active’ neutrality policy attributes were stripped out) and re-named ‘military neutrality’. (See Devine 2011: 347- 349) Linked to this elite policy position, the meaning of ‘military neutrality’ has narrowed in parallel with successive expansive changes to concepts of EU defence policy, from “non-membership of a military alliance, and, specifically, non-membership of an alliance with a mutual defence commitment” in 2003 (Dáil Éireann Vol. 563: 722 emphasis added), to non-membership of “pre-existing military alliances with mutual automatic obligations” in 2004 (Mansergh 2004, emphasis added). Survey data shows that just 5% to 2% of Irish people have defined neutrality as staying out of military alliances from the 1980s to the 2000s (Devine, 2008a:
These divergent ‘active’ and ‘military’ neutrality concepts reflect differing foreign policy agendas (see also Keatinge 1984: 32, 118-119; 1996: 111; McSweeney 1988: 208; Fanning 1996: 147), which explains why Irish people continue to vote against Treaties in referendums to protect Irish neutrality, despite the discourse from the elite that ‘military neutrality’ is unaffected by Treaties.

(2) Reversal of centuries of Irish Foreign Policy (IFP) norms by successive governments

Over the past four decades successive governments have managed to reverse most of Irish foreign policy norms, largely under the radar of public opinion: firstly, as Taoiseach Seán Lemass started the process of eradicating Ireland's independent, activist identity at the United Nations (UN); he was behind a deliberate decision to uphold a moderate line, even if this seemed to contradict the identification between Ireland and the struggling colonies that Frank Aiken had made explicit in his earlier speeches at the UN (Bhreatnach 2005: 182). Lemass had also pushed for Ireland's membership of NATO without consulting his cabinet and in the belief that public opinion should fall in line with this new policy. (Evans, 2011: 225) In the intervening period, Irish public opinion on membership of NATO has not softened: a 1996 MRBI opinion poll showed that just 13% of Irish people would be willing for Ireland to join NATO. (Poll shows a symbolic support for neutrality, *Irish Times*, 5 March 1996)

Secondly, Irish voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly changed. Scholars saw fit to “note some shifts over time, in particular after 1960 – at the time of Ireland’s first application to the EEC – and after 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union.” (Gillissen 2007: 69) Academics had expressed fears that “both Irish politicians and foreign policy officials will hide behind the EC claiming both that the Community is the principal medium through which it must act while at the same time using the EC as an excuse for inaction.” (Holmes et. al. 1993: 141-142) These fears were realised thereafter through the government’s claims that EU membership and the formation of a common [foreign policy] position means that there is “less opportunity to state a distinctive Irish position on many issues” (Dorr 2002: 115) and that “Ireland should look increasingly to its interests rather than to ideals which may have been appropriate to another bygone era.” (Dorr 2002: 119)

Thirdly, neutrality was reformulated and redefined from “neutrality” to “military neutrality” to the current wording, “non-aligned” (despite the fact that Ireland is in fact military aligned through the WEU military alliance that the EU absorbed through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009), and disassociated from the norms and values of Irish peace policy. The long-standing plans for the EU to subsume the WEU’s institutions, functions and responsibilities, including its mutual defence clause, were rarely acknowledged in Irish government discourses, although neutrality advocates raised the issue as far back as 1963 (Corish Dáil Éireann Vol. 199 Col. 1044 (5 February 1963)) and continued to raise it in the 1980s and the 1990s in the context of European Political Cooperation (McCartan/MacGiolla/Higgins Dáil Éireann Vol. 382Cols. 1007-8 (21 June 1988)) and in relation to the Maastricht Treaty (de Rossa Dáil Éireann Vol. 418 Cols. 1089 – 1090 (8 April 1992)). (Devine, 2009b: 30) Previously, governments were against (1) any EC
role in military affairs and security and defence policy: (Collins Dáil Éireann Vol. 359: Col. 1994); (2) the merger of the WEU with the EU; and (3) signing up to the WEU’s mutual defence clause or any version of a collective defence commitment (Dáil Éireann Vol. 359: Col. 1977-1978), but by the early 2000s, the government had reversed all three positions. These reversals were undertaken, not because these changes are beneficial to Ireland’s foreign policy goals or because PfP-linked NATO ‘peace support’ or WEU Petersberg Task ‘crisis management’ operations are more legitimate or effective but because of, (to quote the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern), a need to accept “organisational realities in Europe” and “the settled preference of all our partners to work mainly with and through existing structures in developing the common European foreign and security policy” (Dáil Éireann Vol. 479: Col. 654), i.e. WEU and NATO.

Finally, despite the United Nations perspective in the Brahimi Report that “the growth in European regional peacekeeping initiatives further depletes the pool of well-trained and well-equipped military contingents from developed countries to serve in United Nations-led operations” (2000: 18), the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern stated in 1999 that “Over the next decade, the emphasis will be on co-operation in the EU on the Petersberg Tasks” (Dáil Éireann, Vol. 506 Col. 837, 22 June 1999) and in pursuing this objective, the government was more concerned with constructing the EU as a global actor, seen through its claim that Ireland should participate in ESDP missions to “signal the strength of the EU’s capability to undertake a robust and large-scale mission.” (Ireland, 2004) Academics proffer that the Irish government has been “neither honest nor realistic” in executing “a clear move away from traditional UN operations in favour of the post Cold War model of ‘tendered out’ or delegated peace support operations.” (Murphy, 2002: 33)

(3) The European Union (EU)’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

In October 2002, the European Commission identified a new priority as an information topic for dissemination, “the role of the European Union in the world” (2002: 13). In 2007, the EU started to seriously engage in external public diplomacy, using the 50-anniversary “to launch a huge public diplomacy exercise across the world.” (European Commission, 2007: 13) The EU’s CSDP main objective is enhancing the EU’s image as a global actor. As Alyson Bailes said, regarding the genesis of the ESDP in 1999, “no one talked much at the time about doing something for the ‘good of the world’. A lot of people were thinking about the good of Europe”. (2008: 1) The ESDP/CSDP is driven by France’s desire to create a “Europe Puissance” or European Superpower against the ‘hyper puissance’ of the United States of America (USA) in the context of a perceived “unipolar world” created by the end of the Cold War. One of the reasons for the lack of a common foreign policy at the EU level and the slower development of an EU military force capable of rivalling US capabilities is the United Kingdom (UK)’s traditional respect for the ‘special relationship’ with USA and desire to maintain NATO priority over and above the European Union military alliance created by the WEU-EU merger set in train in 1999 and finalised in 2009. Nonetheless, in 1999, the UK Prime Minister (1997-2007) Tony Blair clearly viewed C/ESDP as providing the UK with a key strategic role. Blair outlined his vision that Britain “have a new role…not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power
that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future.”
(22 November 1999)

In 1999, the then French Foreign Minister (1997-2002) Hubert Védrine articulated his assumption that all European peoples want the EU to become a superpower and desire to ensure the EU CSDP projects Europe as a balancing ‘pole’:

A supposer que les Européens veuillent vraiment ensemble devenir une “puissance” -ce à quoi la France s’emploie...Cette interrogation est sous-jacente à toute la question de la politique étrangère européenne commune et de la défense européenne. Pour la France, elle revêt une importance particulière puisque le monde multipolaire qu’elle appelle de ses vœux ne se conçoit pas sans un pôle européen fort,

roughly translates as,

Assuming that all the Europeans really want to become a “power” – this is what France is devoting herself to achieve...... This question underlies the whole question of common European foreign policy and European defense. For France, it is of particular importance since the multipolar world that it calls for is inconceivable without a strong European pole. (Védrine, 1999: 815)

This motive is important as a driver behind the creation of the new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) contained in the Lisbon Treaty. As Major and Mölling explain, “France consistently pushes for the improvement of EU capabilities, in order to raise the EU’s profile to a power independent from the US...it is about developing the EU into a strong regional power, thereby assuring a multi-polar world order” (2007: 7)

The same authors also note, “While it buttresses the EU’s global capacity to act, ESDP also offered France the opportunity to follow its national policy goals. The operations e.g. in DR Congo and Macedonia were mainly modelled on French ideas.” (2007: 7) In an analysis of the motives of the EU in undertaking missions in Africa, specifically, whether for the purposes of power projection to achieve global player status or for normative motives of conflict resolution, the evidence stacked up in favour of the former, with the latter relegated to second order motivations. (Olsen, 2009) Gorm Olsen found that the primary motives for Artemis in 2003 (consisting of a contingent of 2000 troops with France as the framework nation, sent to end the humanitarian crisis in Ituri and facilitate a national negotiated settlement until a UN force could take over) were (a) an attempt to prove that ESDP was viable in the aftermath of the internal division of EU members-states over the invasion of Iraq and (b) to show that France was a military power separate from NATO and (c) to portray the UK as being interested in ESDP. The 2006 operation in the Congo (in support of the UN Mission (MONUC) to protect the airport at Kinshasa and civilians during the election process) was primarily motivated by the EU’s desire to bolster the credibility of the ESDP after the rejection of the Constitution in referendums in France and the Netherlands, to demonstrate Franco-German cohesion, and to serve as ‘a political testing ground for the EU to design forms of intervention’ – ‘the actual situation on the ground in the DRC is only a secondary factor’. For some member-states, the operation was due to second order concerns for the general humanitarian situation in the country. The motives for the mission in Chad in 2008 were to portray the EU as an ethical power in relation to Darfur and as an independent international conflict manager, behind concerns for the humanitarian situation. French NGOs expressed concern that there was a
hidden political agenda because France has stationed at least 3,000 troops in Chad to buttress the pro-French government installed since the 1980s. An explanatory European Parliament memorandum noted “What makes the situation particularly delicate is that EUFOR Tchad/RCA will have to demonstrate its neutrality vis-à-vis the French troops present on the ground and avoid getting drawn into and becoming a pawn in the inter-African political infighting.” (Rouquet and Acikgöz 2008: pt 13) Research evaluating aid allocation to Middle Eastern and North African governments by both France and the USA also found that strategic concerns are highly relevant, whereas civil and political rights only matter in places of no strategic value, with the USA more considerate of civil and political liberties than France, the main force behind the EU’s ESDP. (Pellicer and Wegner, 2009)

Neutral states have traditionally resisted power politics and high intensity military operations, to the extent of questioning the motivations behind interventions in the Middle East, Africa and Asia by larger powers during the Cold War era. It is supposed that in the post-Cold War era, “the end of purely alliance-driven policies left more space for an altruistic or value-driven foreign policy” (Pellicer and Wegner, 2009: 109). Ireland’s attributes as a neutral, postcolonial state with no history of interference and exploitation in other states makes her a good peacekeeper and potentially a provider of good offices in conflict resolution; however, uncritical involvement in interests-oriented CSDP robust military interventions in Europe’s near abroad will reduce Ireland’s standing and defeat ethical foreign policy goals.

(4) Salient global problems

The Irish Foreign Policy Review Document contends that “The international community is confronted with a growing range of complex and inter-linked global issues which require concerted international action. How can Ireland contribute to international efforts to address such challenges?” (Ireland, 2014: 7) In fact, the most pressing global issues have not changed all that much over the past century, merely the actors involved and their resources have morphed over time, as have the means to respond. Éamon de Valera addressed the League of Nations on 26 September 1932 in his capacity as Acting President of the Assembly. He identified mass unemployment and the hundreds of millions facing starvation as “the fundamental problem of our day”, requiring an approach infused solely by the duty to plan for the well-being of “the plain ordinary human beings in every country who feel and think and suffer” and specifically mentioned that the approach must be untainted by “special interests”. He argued that international trade is insufficient to deal with the problem; rather “the whole basis of production, distribution, finance, and credit requires complete overhauling”. (No. 127 NAI DFA 26/31, emphasis added) Eighty-one years later, the current President of Ireland, Mr. Michael D. Higgins echoed not only much the same problems, “the great global challenges of our day – hunger, poverty, human rights, climate justice”, but also the same solutions: “We need new substantive pluralist political economic models and an emancipatory discourse to deliver them”, articulating the fear that, “instead of being citizens we would be reduced to the status of mere consumers; pawns in a speculative chess board of fiscal moves in a game” (Address to European Parliament, 17 April 2013). The difference between de Valera’s era and President Higgins’ era is that greater numbers of people
are now affected by these global issues, whilst the factors underlying these problems have intensified.

Cynthia Enloe, a renowned feminist IR scholar, identified fundamental changes occurring in international politics in the 1980s, citing the US’s lack of status and resources to continue to act as the world’s policeman, despite attempts by successive leaders; European integration going beyond economic to the political sphere; the USSR subordinating military demands to economic needs; the Third World becoming more internally unequal; the increasing globalisation of capital, drugs and AIDS; debt stubbornly spiralling; and governments persisting in sharing coercive formulas for suppressing dissidents in the name of national security (Enloe, 1989: 200)

All of these trends have intensified thirty years on: Emmanuel Saez has plotted the growth of income and wealth inequality (Saez, 2013); Sarkees and others point to the persistence of conflict, violence and war, whilst the Journal of Peace Research article published in 2013 on ‘Data and progress in peace and conflict research’ found increases in civil and intra-state wars (Sarkees, Wayman and Singer, 2003: 53, 58; Gleditsch, Metternich and Ruggeri, 2013: 4); SIPRI has plotted the increase in global arms trade (i.e. over the period since 2002, arms sales by the Top 100 Arms TNCs have increased by 51 per cent in real terms: SIPRI, 2011, 2013), partly enabled by links between the military industrial complex with [corrupt] government - my own research cites examples of the Helmut Kohl-led German government taking bribes from many sources including arms dealers over a 25 year period, whilst the current German Chancellor Angela Merkel was then party secretary, and the current German Finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble was found to have personally taken DM 100,000 from an arms dealer - to the more recent Ferrostaal scandal (Devine, 2013: 403; Ferrostaal, 2011); Mintz and Swartz identified structural hegemony in the continued consolidation of intercorporate power and networks in the mid-1980s (1985: xii), another dynamic which has intensified: the work of Vitali and others on The Network of Global Corporate Control published in 2011 finds evidence of a corporate and financial elite “super-entity” in control of governments, economies and the media (147 TNCs control of 4/10 of TNC wealth globally (Vitali, Glatterfelder and Battiston, 2011: 4); the Business Insider identifies six companies that control the US media in 2011 compared with 90 in 1983 (Business Insider, 2012)). Societies are still contending with the largely ignored political consequences of interpersonal and intrasocietal coercion and non-fatal use of force (see the World Health Organisation report by Krug et al., 2002), including government repression in modern democracies (Regan and Henderson, 2002). Academics posed the question “Are Democracies Internally Less Violent”: Regan and Gartner’s (1996) thesis is that democracies and autocracies are equally as likely to repress their citizens – the extent of repression is merely correlated with the government/leader’s perception of the credibility and magnitude of the threat posed to the regime. Finally, the current era’s escalating environmental challenges outlined in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report (IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5), 2013) show no signs of significant improvement. These are the most pressing issues that Irish foreign policy should address.

Colonization used to be associated with the occupation of a foreign land, with its being brought under cultivation, with the settlement of colonists. Nowadays, colonization is considered as the expansionary act of imposing political sovereignty over foreign territory and people. (Dietler,
According to Osterhammel’s definition, imperialism differs from colonialism largely as a matter of scale: it is “the concept that comprises all forces and activities contributing to the construction and maintenance of transcolonial empires”. For Enseng Ho, colonialism consists of “the occupation of territory by foreign settlers, soldiers or administrators,” and it involves the notions of possession and property. Imperialism is a different form of domination in that it is a relationship of influence rather than possession. It is the projection of power across space, including the boundaries of nominally sovereign states, by a variety of means, such as economic penetration or manipulation, clientelism, political alliances, and intimidating performances of military muscle. In the past fifty years, a shift from state-led colonization to a corporate-political elite-driven colonization of peoples has occurred, whether entire nations or sub-classes within nations are subjugated, with new means available to achieve different forms of colonisation, including the use of EU as a legal and administrative vehicle.

In Ireland, we are suffering the consequences of an escalating form of subjugation: the €400bn bank guarantee in 2008 followed by the transfer of private corporate debt in banks across Europe and the US to the Irish state and people in a move that failed to separate banking debt from sovereign debt, whilst the imposition of a €85bn loan to service this debt has “indentured citizens to bail out risk-taking investors” (Higgins, 2013). The network of elites who orchestrated this act of re-colonization stretches back and forth across the Atlantic and is comprised of both TNC and state figures. There is seemingly little difference between colonizations of old and new: both are equally rife with corruption and injustice. A central goal of Irish Foreign Policy strategy must involve robust and effective resistance by Ireland, preferably in a coterie of other targeted small states, to becoming neo-colonial pawns in the power politics games of the large states in the system. Irish Foreign Policy must fight to reverse the legacy of colonialism, whether state or corporate, and its effects on poverty, development, democracy and global justice. Campaigns like Drop the Debt and proposals for a Tobin Tax do not go far enough: a colonization legacy tax (CLT) directed at states and corporations could attempt to account for and quantify the long-term impact of colonization, and re-distribute funds into local and national community development projects. This type of radical approach must be complemented by work on eliminating discrimination internally, whether on the basis of gender, social disadvantage, or other categories of pervasive minorities.

(5) The Politics of Discourses on Irish Foreign Policy and EU CSDP

Imperialism is usefully defined as an ideology or set of discourse that motivates and legitimizes practices of expansionary domination by one society over another, whether those practices are through military conquest or economic or fiscal dependency. Corporate and political elite harnessing the media and promotion of propaganda is a method of sustaining imperialism and reducing resistance to modern day colonization strategies. The production of discourses aimed at undermining public foreign policy values and obscuring CSDP developments is an important point to address in this submission.

The methods involve funding think-tanks, and the production of non-peer-reviewed, pseudo-‘academic’ publications disseminated in Ireland and abroad. Governments set up ‘secondary
diplomacy’ responses using former Ministers, Taoisigh and retired diplomats to obscure debate and suppress information, rather than be seen to respond directly. My own research found that politicians and journalists have serviced this goal by repeating the same set of ‘uneutral Ireland’ discourses through print media and non-peer-reviewed publications. (Devine, 2006) The EU spends an estimated €2.4 billion on internal and external EU information campaigns annually, “more than Coca Cola spends on advertising each year – worldwide” (Mullally, 2008: 7). The objective of “Jean Monnet” funding (worth EUR 34.5 million in 2014 (European Union, 2013: 17)) is understood in practice to encourage “associations of professors and researchers to communicate, teach and promote the European Integration Process” (University of Cyprus, 2007, emphasis added) - as NATO puts it, “at other times, policy issues are better communicated by third parties, such as think tanks and academics, than through official statements” (Babst, 2009: 6). References have been made over the years in Dáil Éireann (e.g. Vol. 489 Cols. 36-37, 25 March 1998) to the strategic cooperation between political parties, and the particular agenda and lack of objectivity of agents based in the Institute of [International and] European Affairs as factors creating hegemonic CSDP discourses. These strategies significantly undermine the basic public information element of human security and democracy, as forces coalesce to dominate discourses on Irish foreign policy and the EU CSDP in the media and social networking fora, especially during referendums in Ireland on European Union treaties.

Governments engage in such heinous activities directly, also: for example, a leaked memo of a British diplomat’s report to London outlined aspects of the Irish government’s strategy to secure a ‘yes’ vote in the Lisbon Treaty referendum, which included running a campaign whereby “the aim is to focus the campaign on overall benefits of the EU, rather than on the Treaty itself”, coupled with a propaganda campaign to convince the Irish people that out of gratitude to the EU for the receipt of structural funds, they should ‘owe’ the EU a “yes” vote in EU treaty referendums. Languishing in a zone of meaningful silence, is the fact that Ireland is the second biggest indirect net contributor to the EU after Germany, having contributed over 40 million tonnes of fish extracted from Irish waters (the second most important in terms of Europe’s edible fish stocks), worth an estimated €200 billion. A key strategy of Irish Foreign Policy should be to bring to light the facts of Ireland’s EU membership in a fresh, more reality-focused perspective - as a former Taoiseach pointed out in 1996:

Although European Union membership has been of great benefit to us, it has also been of benefit to others, and has costs as well as benefits. We are prone to be somewhat naive about this..... We opened up our markets and had to allow other countries more generous access to our fish stocks than we have ourselves. These are items on both sides of the balance sheet. If we are to be realistic, we should not labour under the idea that we have some special debt or obligation to our partners or that we have been the beneficiary of positive discrimination. We have not. (Ahern, Dáil Éireann Vol. 463 Col. 1317, 28 March 1996)

The real balance sheet shows that the EU has a net benefit in excess of €140bn derived from the island-nation resources of the Irish people and state. (Devine, 2012)

The Irish government also colluded with the European Commission to ensure it would tone down or delay any announcements that might damage the Lisbon ‘Yes’ campaign, including the
implementation of provisions on defence (Irish Daily Mail, 14 April 2008). The Government also sought to suppress the fact of the end of Ireland’s neutrality in the context of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty provisions finalising the core elements of the EU military alliance through the WEU-EU merger and the EU’s adoption of the WEU’s mutual defence clause. This fact, openly touted in European think-tank associates’ discourses - “the EU is now a military as well as a political and economic alliance. A new government needs to explain why this is a good thing…” (Burke, 2011: 205) – was risibly and incredulously described as “startling” by ‘analyst’ members of the think-tank network (Patrick Keatinge, Peadar Ó Broin and Ben Tonra of the Institute for International and European Affairs in Dublin), seemingly intent on obscuring this basic fact for political purposes during the Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign (see Irish Times, 27th November 2009; 24th December 2009).

**Human Security: accounting for the factors of education and information**

The latest Council Conclusions on CSDP (2013: 3) claim to recognise “that coherence between security and development, taking into account human rights and human security, both at a policy and an operational level, is a process that requires short-term improvements and longer term action” (emphasis added). The Irish Foreign Policy Review Document does not reference the framework of human security. The idea of human security is an attempt to conceptualize the changing nature of security. It recognizes that “the security of one person, one community, one nation rests on the decisions of many others - sometimes fortuitously, sometimes precariously”, and that “policies and institutions must find new ways to protect individuals and communities” (Commission on Human Security (CHS), 2003: 2-4). The Commission on Human Security uses a broad definition: “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment”. In the Commission’s report, Amartya Sen conceptualizes human security as narrower than either human development or human rights: “the insecurities that threaten human survival or the safety of life, or imperil the natural dignity of men and women, or expose human beings to the uncertainty of disease and pestilence, or subject vulnerable people to abrupt penury” (CHS, 2003: 8-9)

Thus, human security also focuses on “sudden economic downturns, natural disasters and the social impact of crises” (CHS, 2003: 2) The shocking rise in unemployment from 4.8% in December 2007 when the Lisbon Treaty was signed by the Irish Government, to 14.4% some four years later in December 2011, occurred despite the clearly untruthful claim made by the Irish government, Department of Foreign Affairs, political parties, employer bodies, the Referendum Commission and European Commission-funded ad-hoc campaign groups like “Ireland for Europe” that the Lisbon Treaty was about jobs and economic recovery in Ireland. This collective group spend an estimated €10,206,000 (against just €780,000 by the ‘no’ side) in the second Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign claiming “my job depends on Europe”, “It’s simple, I’m safer in Europe”, “yes to jobs, yes to Europe”, “yes to recovery, yes to Europe”, “ruin or recovery, vote ‘yes’”. The same threats continued to be levelled at the Irish people in a following referendum on the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the European Union, seemingly to force the Irish people into voting ‘yes’, as politicians claimed that the Treaty is linked to economic recovery and jobs (Creighton, Morning Ireland, RTE Radio, 29/02/12). Under the EU-ECB-IMF bailout programme, Ireland has experienced (1) increased unemployment, (2) double the rate of emigration (Emigration rate jumps by nearly half, Irish
Times 16 September 2011) and (3) the highest suicide rate in the history of the state (Suicide rate at all-time high says Minister, (Irish Times 8 April 2011).

The UN Commission on Human Security posits that “Basic Education and public information that provide knowledge... are particularly important for human security... to enable people to exercise their rights and fulfil their responsibility”. Despite protestations from students and staff alike, the last remaining module on Irish Foreign Policy taught at the third level of education in Ireland has been axed, resulting in the situation that no university in Ireland delivers a module on contemporary Irish Foreign Policy at either undergraduate or postgraduate level in the current academic year. One other university lists an undergraduate module on the politics of Irish foreign policy but does not deliver it; rather, a module on Ireland’s ‘adaptation’ to EU membership is offered. Like Irish Foreign Policy itself, the academic subject is now confined to the annals of history. This is a national disgrace, a serious violation of academic freedom, and arguably, if not assuredly, part of a deliberate strategy to erase critical and independent teaching of this vital subject area concerned with national policy and identity.

Within the human security paradigm, ‘empowerment’ is as much a key component of human security as ‘protection’. When governments collude with each other, and use a network of media, academic and think-tank based individuals to sediment their discourses, and in doing so, oppress individuals telling the truth of crucial foreign policy matters, they violate core principles of human security. Government suppression of information on the reality of EU treaties effectively disenfranchises the people of Ireland and prevents them from taking decisions in all areas of national policy in their own interests and in the interests of those in the wider community. Therefore, a crucial element of future Irish foreign policy must involve a cessation of Government suppression of information including the targeting, directly and indirectly, of those supplying information, so that treatment of Irish people during and after EU referendums is ethical, fair, and bears witness to the truth.

Conclusions

Ireland’s anti-Imperialists were determined to persuade other countries in the world “that this country is not, and will not be, automatically involved in war, merely because Britain is involved in war, that this diplomatic and military unity of the British Empire does not exist, and that we will prevent it existing” and sought the creation of an Irish Department of External Affairs to achieve this goal (Dáil Éireann, Vol. 14: Cols. 574-575). In the post-Cold War era, neutrality still embodies a globally-focussed perspective with a distinct anti-imperialist philosophy – qualities that are useful for successful conflict resolution. Neutrality also underpins the effective delivery of aid. It is argued that neutrality provides the possibility for neutral states to be norm entrepreneurs, highlighting neutrals’ participation in peace-building measures as a niche practice, particularly in cases involving sovereignty-sensitive nations and in states having a history with a former colonial power. (Agius and Devine, 2009) For the mass public, neutrality is a first principle restraint on the war-making proclivities of the elite, and is particularly important for people of a small postcolonial state who are intimately acquainted with the behaviours of imperialist, colonizing states and their legacies.
Marek Kohn distinguishes between “thin” and “thick” concepts of trust developed through association at the level of the individual: “thick” trust grows with repeated observations of competent performance of another’s actions, which consistently meet accepted moral standards, or seeing that an individual is considerate towards others in general. “Thin” trust derives from reputations based on signals of appearance or demeanour, but ultimately requires some reference to experience of the other (2008:89). In a study of *Trust in International Cooperation*, Brian C. Rathbun juxtaposes trust with fear: “Just as generalized trust is based on an attribution about others’ trustworthy character rather than their interests, fear is premised on a belief that others are dispositionally evil and intent on destruction and violence.” (2012: 216, emphasis added) To return to my point made in the introduction of this submission, about promoting a positive image of Ireland as a first, not last, priority for the Review of Irish Foreign Policy: trust is a beneficial outcome of promoting a positive image abroad through concrete foreign policy positions and actions - at the level of the individual and at the international system – and why a positive image underpins all of the issues (including interests) referred to within Irish foreign policy.

To conclude this argument, I refer to Richard Ned Lebow’s seminal book *Why Nations Fight* that identifies a shift in thinking concerning the nature of standing in world affairs. Status and recognition as a Great Power was accorded through military power in the past, but nowadays states can be more confident in seeking reputation and honour in different ways, and diverting resources that otherwise would go to security towards the achievement of “standing and status by alternative means”. Lebow sees evidence of rewards for such behaviour: he cites a 2007 BBC poll showing a significant increase in the standing of countries associated with alternate visions of the international system. When people were asked what countries exerted a positive influence in the world, Canada and Japan topped the list at 54% (2010: 21). It is perhaps of no coincidence that the Canadian and Japanese governments have been long-standing advocates of Human Security. (Dóchas, 2007) Ireland has the history, the leadership legacy, the motivation, and the values necessary to achieve similar standing enjoyed by Canada and Japan among the peoples of the world; she has the chance to implement the “Nelson Mandela” of global foreign policy. Indeed, many years ago, the Labour Party itself had argued that neutrality espoused many foreign policy goals that could be pursued using EPC (an old form of EEC foreign policy cooperation) and the UN, *if a government had the guts to do so* (Dáil Éireann, Vol. 327: Col.1445-1446, emphasis added). Instead, the government has capitulated to vested interests, abandoned neutrality, and in that process, the norms of democracy. The betrayal of these values can be reversed. The government has the agency to pursue this path, difficult though it may be. But it will not happen in the absence of public pressure.

In June 2000, Koffi Annan argued that

> The public are determined to play a role and have a say in the decisions which affect them. And that new impetus, what I call the new diplomacy, the people power, which is putting energy and pressure behind governments and international organizations to be responsible, is going to be a very effective factor.

Although the direction of the trends in global issues I outlined earlier is discouraging, there are other global trends that can support a positive (re)vision of Irish foreign policy. Data also shows
increased numbers of international organizations (Milner in Milner and Moravcsik, 2009: 6), non-state actors (Boli and Thomas 1997: 179), and NGOs (UIA, 2013) active in global politics, as well as the emergence and spread of new information technologies (internet users have increased five-fold in the ten years until 2010 (TechBlog, 2010, roughly doubling every five years to reach two and a half billion currently (TechBlog 2012; World Internet Stats, 2013)) which indicates that there are tools to harness mass support for an ethical, alternative foreign policy stance. It remains to be seen whether the Review of Ireland’s Foreign Policy will seize the opportunity.

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